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Abstract
We are investigating a paradigm of instability in coalition forming among countries, which
indeed is intrinsic to any collection of individual groups or other social aggregations.
Coalitions among countries are formed by the respective attraction or repulsion caused by
the historical bond propensities between the countries, which produced an intricate circuit
of bilateral bonds. Contradictory associations into coalitions occur due to the independent
evolution of the bonds. Those coalitions tend to be unstable and break down frequently.
The model extends some features of the physical theory of Spin Glasses. Within the
frame of this model, the instability is viewed as a consequence of decentralized maximization
processes searching for the best coalition allocations. In contrast to the existing literature, a
rational instability is found to result from forecast rationality of countries.
Using a general theoretical framework allowing to analyze the countries’ decision making
in coalition forming, we feature a system where stability can eventually be achieved as a result
of the maximization processes. We provide a formal implementation of the maximization
principles and illustrate it in the multi-thread simulation of the coalition forming. The results
shed a new light on the prospect of searches for the best coalition allocations in the networks
of social, political or economical entities.
Keywords: Coalitions Forming, Social Modeling, Social Simulation, Political Instability,
Economical Instability, Statistical Physics.
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1 Introduction
The subject of our study is the phenomena of instability in coalition forming intrinsic to any
collective of individual groups. To illustrate the presentation keeping it close to topical interest,
we address the coalition forming in an aggregate of countries. However, the discussion and the
results can be applied to any type of collective in political, social or economical sciences.
For centuries, countries have been undergoing parallel processes of association into unities seek-
ing mutual support and cooperation, and fragmentation of the unities due to the bilateral conflicts.
Association and fragmentation are driven by the character of relationships and interactions built
by the countries through the history. These interactions have formed very strong bilateral mutual
propensities between the countries, the propensities to cooperate or to conflict.
These propensities are the key factors that determine the association into coalitions. Like in the
well known saying ”the enemy of an enemy is a friend”, we assume only two competing coalitions.
Guided by the postulate of lowest energy, we expect that positive propensities encourage countries
to ally to the same coalition, while negative ones encourage them to affiliate with the opposing
coalition. Thus, the best coalition allocation – the one where the countries have most comfortable
and beneficial position, is achieved in an amalgam of conflict and cooperation. Cooperation between
countries maximizes their benefit (minimizes their local energy) in case of positive propensity.
Negative propensity, on the contrary, minimizes the benefit of cooperation, while it maximizes the
benefit of conflict.
In the model of countries collective we assume that no external forces incite the interactions
between the countries. Consequently, the coalitions are formed only through the attraction or
repulsion caused by the historical bond propensities between the countries.
Spontaneous and independent evolution of the countries mutual propensities produce a priori a
very intricate circuit of bilateral bonds. They are the cause of contradictory association within the
coalitions which may include conflicting countries brought together attracted by common allies.
Such associations tend to be unstable, they break down frequently, forming new associations.
The nominal model is referred as natural model of coalition forming. The model resembles the
Statistical Physics model of Spin Glasses (Binder & Young 1986), which is an idealized model of
bulk magnetism represented by a collection of interacting spins – atoms acting as a tiny dipole
magnet with a mixture of ferromagnetic and anti-ferromagnetic couplings. The countries are
compared to the magnetic dipoles which interact with each other and align themselves in order to
attain the most comfortable position. The collection of spins forms a disordered material in which
the competing interactions cause high magnetic frustration – changes of spins with no energy cost.
In order to reproduce more realistically a system of individual actors that possess rationality,
we suppose the countries observe and make decision before processing to any change. This provides
a basis to a rational instability, which is not only the no-cost frustrations appropriate to the spins,
but also the cost frustrations driven by the future benefit of planned changes. Rationality of the
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instability makes the main difference between the Spin Glass and the present model.
Spin Glass formulations in Statistical Physics are set out in (Binder & Young 1986) and
(Toulouse 1977). The modeling of complex social situations using Statistical Physics has started
from (Galam & Gefen & Shapir 1982). However, the subject of the instability and the stabiliza-
tion in coalition forming using the model is rather recent. The authors of (Galam & Moscovici
1991) study a model of collective decision making combining Social Psychology hypotheses with
recent concept of Statistical Physics. Then, the coalition as a form of aggregation among a
set of actors (countries, groups, individuals) has been studied using concepts from the the-
ory of Spin Glasses (Axelrod & Bennett 1998; Florian & Galam 2000; Galam 1996, 1998,
2002; Gerardo & Samaniego-Steta & del Castillo-Mussot & Vazquez 2007; Tim Hatamian 2005;
Matthews 2000).
The seminal paper (Axelrod & Bennett 1998) applies the Spin Glass model to the ag-
gregation and the alignment of actors. In (Galam 1996), this application has been shown
to be insufficient to describe the instabilities of coalitions. The author extends the idea by
combining both random-site and random-bond Spin Glass models. He, then proposes a po-
litical model allowing to reproduce the incompatible interactions in the formation of coali-
tions. Various social application of the model were suggested. For example, (Galam 2002;
Gerardo & Samaniego-Steta & del Castillo-Mussot & Vazquez 2007) use it to explain the forma-
tion of coalitions and suggest its social and political application. The dynamical analogue of the
model and it’s viability is discussed in (Vinogradova 2012).
There is also literature that studies social or inter-agents stabilization using a different class of
models. (Antal & Krapivsky & Redner 2006) consider transition of social network to a balanced
state by dynamical changes of sign of the mutual links, and (Acemoglu & Egorov & Sonin 2006)
feature the formation of coalition by dynamical collective decision making.
The literature studying the coalition forming based on the Spin Glass model analyze the phe-
nomena within a Markovian frame of spontaneous instability. In contrast, the current work assumes
long horizon rationality of the actors to develop the rational instability framework of coalition form-
ing. This allows to explore and study the complex behaviors among individual actors possessing
rationality when they form coalitions.
Let us note that, while in Spin Glass model the Game Theory equilibrium represents a stable
configuration of the spins, the equilibrium guarantees no stability in a model where the agents do
not stop searching upon achieving their local maximums. Therefore, the game-theoretic tools are
not appropriate for the stabilization objective of our model.
In this work, we extend the model proposed by (Galam 2002) and provide a detailed analysis of
the instability rooted in the coalition forming as a decentralized maximization processes driven by
each country’s objective to attain its best coalition allocations. We study the terms of existence of
the optimal and stable coalitions, and the ways to reach them in the ranges of extensive or limited
rationality. This allows to shed a new light on the interesting and little explored phenomena such
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as information manipulation and non-optimal stability, which are peculiar to any network of selfish
actors.
Among the results, the model provides an explanation of why in most cases in practice where
the rationality prevails, the instability constantly follows the natural coalition forming.
The model’s theoretical framework is supplemented by historical examples that justify the
practical use of the model. We also provide the description and the illustration of a multi-threaded
simulation of coalition forming in the natural model that is created for this particular aim. Finally,
we provide concluding remarks and discuss the directions of the further study.
2 Natural Model of Coalition Forming
How does the historical and geographical background impact the current interactions between the
countries? Based on their historical experience the countries decide weather to agree or disagree
on the present policies. Respectively, the agreement is unfavorable to the countries which went
thought of rejection. The same way, the disagreement is unfavorable to the countries that passed
through a conflict in their past. The primary mutual propensities between countries are the issues of
their historical experience so that their character of cooperation or conflict can hardly be changed.
Those propensities affect all the subsequent interactions and exchanges between the countries.
Here, we present the natural model of coalition forming that describes a system of countries
maintaining short range interactions which are guided by the primary mutual propensities.
Consider a group of N independent countries which had experienced geographic, cultural or
economic interactions during their history. The countries are respectively denoted by characters
or indicators ranging from 1 to N . Each country thus makes its choice among two options +1
and −1, corresponding to two possible coalitions. The same choice allies the countries to the
same coalition, while different choices separate them into the opposite ones. According to the
postulate of minimum conflict, being part of the same coalition benefits the countries with the
propensities to cooperate, while countries inclined to conflict bear loses from the cooperation. A
country is represented by a discrete variable that can assume one of the two state values S = +1
and S = −1. The combination S = {S1, S2, S3, . . . , SN} makes up the configuration of the choices
of the countries. The configuration of choices, as well as it’s inverse S = {−S1,−S2,−S3, . . . ,−SN}
by symmetry, represents a particular configuration of coalitions in the system.
Consider any two countries i and j, and denote by Jij the value that measures the degree and
the direction of the historical exchanges between the countries. Jij represents the bond of original
propensity between the countries, which is symmetric, Jij = −Jji, and may vary for each pair
of countries. Jij = 0 when no mutual bond exists between the countries, which represents an
absence of a direct exchange. We shall describe by JijSiSj the measure of the interaction between
the countries as a function of their choices. In case the countries agree, i.e., when Si = Sj , a
positive value of Jij results in the positive effect for both the countries. When Jij is negative, the
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cooperation between the countries results in a negative effect on both the countries. That would
agree with a widespread notion saying that conflicting countries gain from disoperation while incur
losses from cooperation.
Thus, the propensities either favor the cooperation (Jij > 0), the conflict (Jij < 0), or signify
the ignorance (Jij = 0) where neither the agreement nor the disagreement influences the outcome
of the countries.
For the sake of visualization, we represent the system of countries as a connected weighted graph
with the countries in the nodes and the bilateral propensities as the weights of the respective edges,
(see Figure (1)). We take red (dark) color for +1 choice and blue (light) color for −1 choice.
Figure 1: Triangle of three countries connected by negative bond propensities – ESF conflicting
triangle.
Sum of the measures of all the interactions of a country i in the system is the net gain of the
country
Hi(S) = Si
∑
j 6=i JijSj (1)
. The total gain in the system in configuration S is measured by the total of the contributions in
the configuration
H(S) = 1
2
∑
iHi(S). (2)
The natural model is formally identical to the Ising Model of Spin Glass in Statistical Physics.
The model consists of N discrete variables of magnetism {Si}N1 , called spins, that can be in one
of two states up or down. See figure (2). The spins, arranged in a lattice or a graph interact
at most with its nearest neighbors. Spins with the same states are associated to each other, and
disassociated from those with the opposite states.
In this analogy, the total gain H(S) in the system is identical to the Hamiltonian of an Ising
random bond magnetic system. The model of the Spin Glass has been solved numerically with
much effort ((Binder & Young 1986)).
2.1 Illustrating of The Natural Model Trough an Historical Example
As an example of an unstable system we suggest to consider the typical conflicting triangle of
Spain, England and France, which were alternatively enemies and allies during a long period of
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Figure 2: Ising model of 8-spins with negative pair interactions. Spins that shift their states with
no loss of energy, called frustrated spins, are marked by both up and down the states. A Spin
Glass in an unstable disorder.
time. For these countries, the period of 1521 – 1604 has been marked by the series of land and
sea wars driven by the historical background of colonization, religion and by the naval technical
progress. The commercial rivalry between England and Spain, and political and religious ambitions
of France were the major forces that pushed Europe into wars. The conflicts were usually initiated
between any two of the countries with the third one joining the one or the other side. Accordingly,
the historical background of the countries during this period has defined the particular distribution
of mutual negative propensities.
The natural model is shown schematically in the ESF conflicting triangle in Figure (1), where
abbreviations S,E and F stand for the countries’ names. The choices of the countries S, E and
F are represented by the state variables SE ,SS and SF respectively. Different colors attached to
the state nodes of the countries correspond to different coalitions the countries. The state nodes
are linked by the following original propensities JSE = −3, JSF = −2, JEF = −1. The value
of propensities are illustrative only and this is their relative magnitudes are of importance: the
conflict between Spain and France is less deep than the one between Spain and England, yet it is
deeper than the one between England and France.
3 Instability in Coalition Forming
During the coalition forming, at any particular configuration, a country may observe that another
configuration exists where it can reach a higher gain. When it happens, the country shall take
appropriate changes in order to take advantage of this opportunity. The sequence of the changes
constitutes the process of maximization of the countries’ gains.
Maximization, which is a search for the most beneficial coalitions setting is found to produce
an instability. When the countries eventually attain a common satisfactory configuration, the
instability is temporary. When it is a permanent one, the maximization of the countries’ gains is
an endless process.
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3.1 Geometric Terms of Instability
Let us recall that in the natural model we extend the notion of instability of the physical systems
where it is only caused from frustration of spins due to an immediate improvement or due to no
cost of changing. In the broader sense, frustrations due to intended changes aimed to improve the
current gains in further steps are also included. Such improvements are peculiar to the system of
countries which are able to anticipate and adapt to the changes of others. Spins, unlike countries,
are able to evaluate only the effect from the immediate changes. In order to be able to predict such
an unstable character of a system of countries, we provide the necessary and sufficient conditions
of the instability.
Let us take a close look at the heart of the instability. Consider separately from the rest of the
system, two countries i and j connected by their propensity bond pij . When pij is the only link
between the countries, we can easily valuate the contribution from cooperation or conflict between
the countries to their gain: pijSiSj. What complicates the evaluation of their alternative choices
is the presence of the other countries connecting between i and j indirectly.
By a circle in a graph of countries we understand a selection of nodes linked into a closed path
by the propensity bonds. Imagine a situation where the countries i and j is part of a circle and
assume without loss of generality that their mutual propensity is negative while the propensities all
along the rest of the circle are positive (see Figure (3)). In this case, both i and j maximize their
gain in conflict with the other and in cooperation with the rest countries on the circle. Such an
arrangement creates an everlasting competition between i and j for this maximizing arrangement.
The countries continuously shift their choices that produces the instability.
Figure 3: Circle connecting between the countries i and j by a negative and a positive links at the
same time produces an everlasting competition between the countries.
We are now ready to identify the instability formally. Denote a circle of countries by C and
the countries composing the circle by 1, 2, . . . , k. Then the characteristics of the phenomena of
instability in Spin Glasses (Toulouse 1977) can be interpreted in the terms of the natural model:
if there is a closed circle of countries on which the product of total propensities is negative,
Πi,j∈Cpij < 0
then the system is unstable.
(3)
7
Terms (3) feature the instability in a system of countries as a direct consequence of geometry
of the system – presence of a negative circle. In order to identify the instability, the terms require
to examine all the possible circles in the system, while provide no countries’ competition data. We
call (3) geometric terms of instability.
The geometric instability terms, while originate from physics, provide only the necessary con-
dition for the instability in the Spin Glass. The Spin glass with a negative circle can be stable
when, for example, an interaction with a neighbor spin shifts the energy of the spin form zero to
negative and thus keeps the spin from fluctuating. This case illustrated in Figure (4).
Figure 4: Configuration which is stable in Spin Glass and unstable in the system of countries.
In the extended sense of instability, (3) provides also a sufficient condition of instability, the
one that induces the endless competition among the countries for beneficial coalitions.
3.2 Optimal Configurations and Analytical Terms of Instability
By making a choice, a country i realizes one of two possible system’s configurations S+i and S−i
which differ by the country i’s choice Si. In order to select the preferable one, the country needs
to classify the configurations by the order of preference based on the potential gain.
A preference order over a set of elements in general, is defined by a binary relation on the set
which is a collection of ordered pairs of its elements. Each country i’s function of gain Hi sets the
binary relation of preference ≤i over the set of all system’s configurations as follows: configuration
S′ is less preferred than S′′, S′ ≤i S
′′ if Hi(S
′) ≤ Hi(S
′′). The total gain in the system H, in turn,
sets the relation ≤sys where S′ ≤sys S′′ if H(S′) ≤ H(S′′). Each of the relations {≤i}Ni=1 and ≤sys
defines a partial order over the set of configurations – the order that indicates a relation between
some elements while others remain unrelated. For each particular partial order, those unrelated
configurations yield the same gain to the country and therefore belong to the same equivalence
classes. The equivalence classes thus are strictly ordered from minimal to maximal.
Each equivalence class, unifying under the same gain the configuration and its inverse, contains
at least two configurations which a priori leaves only half of the possibilities of different gains,
2N−1.
The maximal configurations of a country are contained in its maximal equivalence class. Sim-
ilarly, the system’s maximal configurations are in the system’s maximal equivalence class. Con-
sequently, the common maximal configurations, which are those that satisfy all the countries, lie
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in the intersection of the maximal equivalence classes of all the countries. If we denote by Cγii an
equivalence class of country i corresponding to gain γi, and by C
Γi
i the maximal equivalence class,
then the set of common maximal configurations is determined by
SΓi = ∩Ni=1C
Γi
i . (4)
If SΓi 6= ∅, then the countries share the same maximal configuration in the system. The
configuration is an optimal configuration, the one that satisfies all the countries and guarantees
stability of the system.
Statement 1 Formula (4) provides new terms of the instability reading that if
∩Ni=1C
Γi
i = ∅ (5)
than the system is not stable in any configuration.
This is the analytical terms that, along with the indication of system’s stability, provide particular
optimal configurations, as well as the respective values of gains of the countries.
Here, the phenomena of instability is explained by the fact that, a priori, preference orders of
different countries do not coincide, and consequently, maximal coalitions for one country is not
maximal for the others.
Statement 2 Let us remark that when an optimal configuration exists, it is unique up to inverse.
Assume, by contradiction, that there are two different optimal configurations which however
are not the inverse of each other, O1 and O2. Then, there is at least one country whose states
differ in the two configurations, and another country whose states agree in the configurations. As
far as we consider a connected system, there are necessarily two such countries which are connected
by a propensity bond. Denote them by i and j. Then, SO1i = −S
O2
i and S
O1
j = S
O2
j .
Assume, without loss of generality, that Ji,j = J > 0. Since O1 and O2 are both optimal then
Hi(O1) = Hi(O2). Since they differ by the states of i, there is country k such that Ji,k = −J and
the following holds: Hi(O1) = Hi(O2) − Ji,j + Ji,k and Hi(O2) = Hi(O1) + Ji,j − Ji,k. Then,
either there is a negative circle connecting i, j and k, or there is another configuration O3 such
that Hi(O3) = Hi(O1,O2) + Ji,j + Ji,k. Which is a contradiction to the maximality of O1 and
O2.
3.3 Illustration of Stable and Unstable Systems
Consider the example having no optimal configuration.
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Example 1 (Unstable System)
Consider again the traditional conflicting triangle of Spain, England and France as in Figure (1).
We feature the instability of the triangle from the perspective of the countries preference orders
over the configurations.
Each configuration is of the form S = (SE , SS , SF ). The 8 different configurations in total rep-
resent 4 different coalitions. The functions of the countries’ gains which areHE = −3SESS−SESF ,
HS = −3SSSE − 2SSSF , and HF = −SFSE − 2SFSS produce the following equivalence classes of
the countries:
The equivalence classes of E:
ΓE = 4 : C
4
E = {(−1,+1,+1), (+1,−1,−1)},
ΓE = 2 : C
2
E = {(+1,−1,+1), (−1,+1,−1)},
ΓE = −2 : C
−2
E = {(+1,+1,−1), (−1,−1,+1)},
ΓE = −4 : C
−4
E = {(+1,+1,+1), (−1,−1,−1)}.
The equivalence classes of S:
ΓS = 5 : C
5
S = {(−1,+1,−1), (+1,−1,+1)},
ΓS = 1 : C
1
S = {(+1,−1,−1), (−1,+1,+1)},
ΓS = −1 : C
−1
S = {(+1,+1,−1), (−1,−1,+1)},
ΓS = −5 : C
−5
S = {(+1,+1,+1), (−1,−1,−1)}.
The equivalence classes of F :
ΓF = 3 : C
3
F = {(−1,−1,+1), (+1,+1,−1)},
ΓF = 1 : C
1
F = {(+1,−1,+1), (−1,+1,−1)},
ΓF = −1 : C
−1
F = {(−1,+1,+1), (+1,−1,−1)},
ΓF = −3 : C
−3
F = {(+1,+1,+1), (−1,−1,−1)}.
As we can see, there is no common maximal configuration in the ESF triangle since the
intersection of the maximal equivalence classes of the three countries is C4E ∩C
5
S ∩ C
3
F = ∅.
The system thus shifts between the individual maximal coalitions infinitely, driven by each
country’s endless search for its best position.
Figure (5) shows series of transitions in the triangle that cycles exhibiting the endless instability.
The progression starts from S = (+1,+1,+1), which is the worst configuration to all the
countries. At the first step, E changes its state to −1 which yields the country an immediate
benefit of ΓE = 4. This change shifts the countries to the equivalence classes C
4
E , C
1
S and C
−1
F ,
respectively. At the second step, country F make change and moves to C1F equivalence class. Then,
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Figure 5: The diagram of successive configurations transition in the ESF conflicting triangle.
at the step III, E makes a change aimed to get back its best configuration in some further step.
Finally, at the step IV , country S changes to −1, which brings the countries back to the original
equivalence classes C4E , C
1
S and C
−1
F .
Let us now turn to the example of a system where an optimal configuration exists.
Example 2 (Stable System)
A snap shot of the short period in the midst of war against Spain, when England and France were
favorable to each others, illustrates a system where an optimal configuration exists (see Figure
(6)).
Figure 6: In this arrangement, the ESF triangle has an optimal configuration of coalitions – {S},
{E,F}, and thus is a stable system.
The maximal possible gains of E, S and F are HE = 4, HS = 5 and HF = 3, respec-
tively, and the maximal equivalence classes of the countries coincide: C4E = C
5
S = C
3
F =
{(+1,−1,+1), (−1,+1,−1)}. Consequently, there are two optimal configurations in the system,
C4E ∩ C
5
S ∩C
2
3 ∩ C
3
F = {(+1,−1,+1), (−1,+1,−1)}, each of which guarantees its stability.
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4 Rational Maximization of Countries
Maximization of countries’ gains is a rational process which can be defined in a general theoretical
framework linking between the system’s configurations information and the law of the configuration
dynamics.
4.1 Maximization As a Sequence of Individual Choices
As we have mentioned, maximization is a sequence of the changes made by the countries that
aim to improve their benefits. In our model, where the countries are individual actors possessing
rationality, a change is made by the rational components such as the observation and the decision
making.
Let us examine the mechanisms that stand behind the changes. At any configuration S, a
country i can make a choice for its state. The alternative is either to keep the current state, or to
invert it and thus to move to configuration S−i. Making the choice consists of two successive phases
– observations and decision making. The phase of observation involves featuring the equivalence
classes and looking for transitions between the configurations aiming at the immediate or the
further improvements of the gain. The phase of the decision making, in turn, involves the selection
of an immediate reply based on the results of the observation phase. Denote by Oi(S) the set of
desirable configurations and by Di(S) the immediate reply, Di(S) ∈ {S, S−i}.
The decision making phase can be based either on the best reply principle, which accepts the
choices that improve the gain immediately, or on the forecast principle, which takes into account
the choices that improve the gain in a further step. The choice between the equivalent alternatives
can be based either on the principle of random move or on the principle of anticipation of feedback
from the others countries.
The following example illustrates observation and decision making by the countries of the ESF
conflicting triangle in the series of transition of configurations.
Example 3
Figure (7) shows several possible configuration transitions in the conflicting triangle as the result of
particular combinations of observations and decisions made by the countries in the ESF triangle.
The initial configuration S = (+1,+1,−1) belongs to the equivalence classes C−2E , C
−1
S and C
3
F
of E, S and F , respectively. Let us analyze the I − IV transitions shown in the Figure (7).
TI : Observation by E results in OE(S) = {(+1,+1,−1), (−1,+1,−1)} where configuration
(−1,+1,−1) is for the immediate improvement and (+1,+1,−1) is for the improvement
in a further step, which will eventually lead to the E’s maximal configuration (+1,−1,−1).
E makes the decision DE(S) = (−1,+1,−1) and thus moves the system to the equivalence
classes C2E , C
5
S and C
1
F .
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Figure 7: The diagram of transitions of configurations prompted by the decisions in the ESF
conflicting triangle.
Note that, while the change satisfies only country S, it is positive for the system as a whole;
the new configuration is the system’s maximum.
TII : If the change is done by country S who makes the decision DS(S) = (+1,−1,−1), the new
configuration belongs to the classes C4E , C
1
S and C
−1
F .
Though the configuration improves the gain of the system itself, it is not the system’s maxi-
mum.
TIII : If the change is performed by both the countries E and S simultaneously, with DE(S) =
(−1,+1,−1) and DS(S) = (+1,−1,−1), the resulting configuration is S = (−1,−1,−1)
which belongs to the equivalence classes C−4E , C
−5
S , C
−1
F .
This is the worst case for each of the countries, as well as for the system itself.
TIV : When the changes are performed by all the countries E, S and F simultaneously, and the
resulting configuration (−1,−1,+1) belongs to the initial equivalence classes C−2E , C
−1
S andC
3
F
.
It is worth to emphasize that since each country at any time can decide to update or not
to update its state, the transitions are all equiprobable. All the transitions are codified in the
configurations information trees described below.
4.2 Configurations Information Tree
From the point of view of a given country, the choices made by the others are the direct or indirect
outcomes of the country’s own decision. Such dependencies between the country’s choice and the
decision of the others, while developing staring from the initial configuration, define a tree-like
structure.
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We define the configurations information tree as the centralized structure containing all the
possible system’s configurations and all the possible transitions between them. The tree of a
country i is built as follows. At the root there is the initial configuration S of the system. The
root splits into two choice nodes corresponding to the two possible choices of the country +Si and
−Si. Each of the nodes splits into 2
N−1 configuration nodes, which are the possible decisions by
the other countries. Starting from the configuration nodes, the tree develops the same way as it
does from the root. The choice nodes of the tree continue to develop until they correspond to a
configuration that has already appeared in a configuration node of the tree.
The information tree contains the transitions of any feasible maximization processes prompted
by the country. It allows the country to make unlimited observations and to build the best reply
strategy starting from any configuration. Let us look at the information tree of England in the
ESF conflicting triangle of Figure (1).
Example 4 (Information Tree of England in the ESF Conflicting Triangle)
Figure (8) shows the information tree of E. The configuration nodes are marked by red (dark)
color until they or their inverses reappear in the tree, then they are marked by green (light) color.
The values of corresponding countries’ gains are shown next to each configuration node. The choice
nodes are marked by light blue.
The lines proceeding from a configuration node correspond to the choices made by E and the
dashed lines drawn from the choice nodes represent the transitions initiated by the others.
Observation function includes a search for the pathes in the tree that brings to a best config-
uration. The size of the tree defines the lower bound on the complexity of the search, which is
a lower bounds on the minimum amount of time required by the most efficient search algorithm.
Since only one among any two symmetric configurations is developed, and each of the respective
configuration nodes is followed by the two choice nodes, the tree contains O(2N ) nodes. It follows
that the rational functions get harder exponentially as the system grows.
5 A Formal Implementation of Rational Maximization
A system of countries represents a decentralized multi-agent system of individual actors separated
by geographical and cultural distances. The geographical location and the initial conditions fore-
ordain different capacities and different degrees of impact by technological development. Those
distances and differences result in diverse levels of exposure to the system information, as well as in
divers technical capacities of observation. The differences become more distinct with the increase
of the system’s size.
The complete system information available to a country and its extensive technical capacities
contrast with the limited system knowledge and limited capacity. The limited knowledge of a
country prevents from proper observation of the other’s states and decisions. The limited capacity
14
Figure 8: Configurations Information tree of England in the ESF conflicting triangle. In the
tree, the configuration nodes are alternated with the choice nodes followed by the decision of the
country. The root represents the initial configuration.
restricts its ability to build the system information and to track the maximization processes.
Both limitations perturb the observation function of the country introducing limitations in their
rationality.
Another restriction in this concern is the latency in the decision making which affects the quality
of the decision output. Here, we ignore the decision latency as an issue of a different subject.
The following cases can be distinguished in the ranges of the classification of capacities.
I: Imagine a system which has an optimal coalitions and where the countries have extensive
technical capacities. The maximization process in the system is in fact the optimization. A
correct information, the accurate configurations data guarantee the appropriate observation
and decision making and thus are crucial for the optimization.
The existence of unique optimum combined with the countries’ extensive technical capacities
guarantees a rapid stabilization with hight probability. However, systems that stabilize spon-
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taneously are rare. The probability that the system has an optimum vanish exponentially
with the size.
II: The system with no optimum is more likely. This case, combined with the rational instability,
produces the infinite competition for beneficial coalitions that trap the maximization process
into an infinite cycle.
III: Finally, the most real situation is the system with no optimum where some of the countries
have limited system knowledge and a limited capacity. The rationality limitations influence
the maximization which either involves an infinite competition or becomes a finite stabi-
lization. The latter lead to a stable state which though maybe temporary. This case is
investigated in the next section.
5.1 Rationality Limitations and Information Manipulation
In order to attain the maximal benefit with high probability a country have to be able to forecast
the behavior of the others. The forecast principle consists of screening the possible configuration
transitions that can eventually lead to the country’s maximal gain.
It is not enough for a country to be only aware of its neighbors. In order to complete a
proper forecast, the country needs to keep in view all the dependencies and bonds of the other
countries linked to it indirectly. In practice, the forecast screening bases on the logic of the
configurations information tree. Therefore, completeness of the information tree of the country
defines the completeness of its forecasts ability.
As a result of the limited system knowledge and the limited capacity, the country construct an
incomplete. However, it is not only the limited rationality that confines the forecast abilities. The
configuration information trees grow exponentially following the system’s size growth. As a result,
a complete tree gets harder to build, so harder it gets to forecast.
The countries with a limited system knowledge and a limited capacity are unable to build the
complete information trees. Therefore, they are unable to perform a proper forecast of the possible
transitions. As a result, the limited system knowledge and the limited capacity produce such
rationality limitations that, even with a good will, the countries tend to make wrong choices. The
countries may neither know if there is a common maximum, nor be able to forecast the common
behavior and make the corresponding choices.
In practice, in cases of the limited rationality, the rationality itself ceases to be the criterium
of choices and is substituted by inspirations of all kind, such as religious, moral or cultural codes.
Therefore, two coexisting types of countries can be distinguished in such systems: 1) countries
possessing the complete system information and extensive capacities, 2) countries who has a limited
system knowledge and a limited capacity.
While the knowledgeable countries forecast and make choices that should benefit them in a
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future step, the limited countries either make the changes bearing immediate profit or follow the
inspirations and the cultural codes. Not having knowledge necessary to conclude on existence of
a common maximum and not being able to forecast the future steps, the secondary actors are
interested to stay within the set of their local maximums. The countries adhere to the policy
where they undertake changes only upon an immediate improvement.
It is reasonable to assume that inspirations and cultural codes playing a centralizing role on the
limited countries can be imposed by the knowledgeable ones that aims to achieve their benefits.
Such an influence is the essence of information manipulation phenomena.
On this basis, we refer the countries possessing the complete system information and extensive
capacities as primary actors, and the countries who has a limited system knowledge and a limited
capacity as secondary actors.
The information manipulation can be described as acting to provide wrong or partial informa-
tion while pursuing certain objectives. The information manipulation can be viewed as a natural
consequence of the extended rationality of the primary actors.
The combination of knowledge and ignorance may bring to stabilization of the systems despite
of the negative circles. Below we illustrate the system that stabilizes regardless of lack of the
optimum.
Example 5 (Information Manipulation and Non-optimal Stability)
Here, we present a system of four countries (see figure (9)) forming two triangles, a stable and an
unstable, where the latest is identical to the ESF conflicting triangle.
Assume that country 1 is a primary actor who possesses the complete system information
and the extensive capacities, while all the others are the secondary actors having limited system
knowledge and limited capacities. The primary actor’s node is emphasized by the additional circle
around the nodes.
The initial configuration is only profitable to country 3. Therefore, country 1 initiates a max-
imization process by first inverting its state to +1 (step I), and then convincing 2 to invert it’s
state too asserting that 3 going to switch to S3 = −1 (step II). As a result, country 3 changes to
S3 = −1 seeking an immediate improvement. The resulting configuration is the maximal one for
1 and is the stable one long country 3 is unable to lead a profitable maximization process.
Figure 9: Stabilization of a system having a negative circle by the information manipulation.
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The unlimited rationality give to the primary actor (or to group of leading countries with their
own common maximum) an advantage over the others to govern changes leading to profitable
coalitions. The widespread belief that keeping the information is secret benefits country is fully
justified in this case.
However, as soon as a secondary actor supplements the lack of the information with the data
gained by tracking the maximization history or from the information exchange, the non-optimal
stability breaks. Therefore, a non-optimal stable state is rather a temporary one, as it is seen in
history.
The picture changes when an optimum exists. Once the existence is known, the complete
information is the common interest of the countries. In this case, the contrary to the widespread
belief about advantage of keeping information secret is valid: disclosing information helps the
countries to achieve the common profitable coalitions.
The phenomena of the information manipulation is intrinsic to any system of individual actors
where the respective capacities vary. As we have noted, the frame of the natural model is applicable
to the large spectrum of social, political or economics domains, from the dynamics of social opinion
to the dynamics of interactions between publics and private banks.
5.2 Simulation of Coalition Forming in a Finite-size System
To illustrate the coalition forming, we created a graphical computer simulation of the natural
model. The simulation is based on the structure of the model, where the choice making process
consists of phases of observation and decision, as defined earlier. The countries are represented by
the simultaneously running threads whose action readiness grows with the countries rationality.
There is no predefined order on the countries’ decision making.
For the sake of simplification in simulation of individual actors, country’s observation function,
instead of searching for the best paths, is reduced to determination of state bring an immediate
gain. Then, with regards to the type of the actor, the state or its inverse is adopted by the
actor. The primary actors make a disadvantageous change aimed put the system out of its local
maximum and to improve the gains in further steps. Such strategy enables us to fully simulate a
maximization process by following randomly the equiprobable chains of configuration transitions.
In the simulation, the primary actors randomly make the choices due to an expected gain.
The secondary actors undertake only changes bearing an immediate gain. They adhere to the
anticipation of a negative result that provides a benefit without jeopardizing the whole system.
This implies that no rational instability is triggered by the secondary actors, as well as the no-cost
changes.
Here, we present the simulation of coalition forming in a finite-size system that involves both
the primary and the secondary actors. The system in its initial state is shown in figure (10).
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Figure 10: The initial state of a system of 9 countries. Countries countries 1, 4, 6, 7 and 9 are the
primary actors, and 2, 3, 5 and 8 are the secondary actors. Two groups with disconnected primary
actors are formed in the system.
Primary actors are countries 1, 4, 6 and 7, 9. The countries are emphasized by the additional
circles around the nodes in the figure. The remaining countries are the secondary actors.
The primary actors countries form two groups {1, 4, 6} and {7, 9} which have no direct connec-
tion between them.
Both groups have the local common maximums:
S1,4,6 = {(1,−1, 1), (−1, 1,−1)} and S7,9 = {(1, 1), (−1,−1)}.
The negative circles of the system are {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, {3, 4, 5}, {3, 4, 6}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and
{7, 8, 9}. As it can be observed, the system consists of two parts, each of which formes a negative
circle, the right part {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and the left part {7, 8, 9}.
Despite the fact that the right part contains several negative circles, it is being stabilized due
to particular interactions between primary and secondary actors (see the stabilization in Figure
(11)). The right part of the system is stable in the last configuration 15 of the figure: the group
of primary actors 1, 4, 6 meet their common maximum, and none of the secondary actors’ changes
can give an immediate improvement.
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Figure 11: Simulation of the coalition forming – 15 steps of stabilization of the right part.
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Let us look at the stabilization in details:
1. The initial state.
2. The principal actors 4 and 6 simultaneously make an immediate improvement of the gain
time, the principal actors 7 and 9 make the change for an expected gain, and 8 improves its
gain in reply.
3. The principal actor 1 changes for a future gain and 4 improves its gain, 7 and 9 repeats the
previous change.
4. Country 1 improves its gain, 6 makes a change for a future gain and 8 improves its gain.
5. Country 6 improves its gain, 1 makes a simultaneous change for an expected gain, 2 improves
its gain in reply.
6. Country 3 improves its gain in result.
7. Country 6 makes a change for an expected gain and 5 improves its gain in reply.
8. Country 1 makes a change for an expected gain and 6 improves as result, 7 makes the change
for a future gain and 8 improves in result.
9. Country 9 makes the change for an expected gain.
10. Countries 1, 5 and 8 improve their gains.
11. Countries 6 and 7 make the change for their expected gains.
12. Countries 5 improves its gain.
13. Country 9 makes the change for a future gain.
14. Countries 3 and 4 improve their gains, 7 makes the change for a future gain and 8 improves
as result.
15. Countries 3 improves its gain.
In the given disposition, the stability of the right part is solid enough not to be broken despite
of the fluctuation in the left part. Figure (12) ) shows the instability of the triangle {7, 8, 9}, from
the step 16 to the step 22.
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Figure 12: Partial instability – the instability of the left part versus the stability of the right part.
However, the stability of {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} is fragile since it breaks even upon a slight change of
a propensity between the secondary actors. For instance, if the propensity between the countries
2 and 8 rises to 2, the instability of the left part is propagated to the stable right part. Another
example is when the propensity between countries 3 and 5 decreases to −3. Then, country 3 will
be always able to improve its gain immediately from −1 to 1 by inverting its choice.
6 Conclusions and Remarks
The historical examples such as the conflicting triangle of England, Spain and France, the coun-
tries of the whole European Union, the Soviet and the Western camps illustrate the existence of
instability in the formation of coalitions during a significant period of their history.
The mapping from history to the natural model allows us to reproduce and provide an explana-
tion of these instabilities and the cycling of coalitions. It then enable us to analyze the conditions
necessary to the system’s stability.
Overall, achieving optimal or stable coalitions requires a significant computation power and a
complete availability of the information. All types of rationality limitations impact the stabilization
and optimization processes.
It can be seen from our study of the model that, as the system’s complexity grows along with
the connexity and the size, the stable or the optimal state become harder to achieve. To overcome
those difficulties, the large systems (such as the United States of America) tend to subdivide
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themselves into small weakly connected sub-systems that manage their internal optimizations and
stabilizations. Large systems that do not follow this course (the Soviet Union, for example) face
difficulties that come from the complex instabilities communicated to all its parts via the strong
interrelations in the system.
However, a spontaneous maximization that exhibits the bottom-up dynamics of coalition form-
ing is rare to stabilize. The probability that the system becomes stable vanishes exponentially with
the size. As a future research, we aim to consider an amalgam of both top-down and bottom-up
dynamics of the coalition forming. The stabilization by means of an external field could produce
such an apposite amalgam. The external field, while polarizing the interests of the countries, leads
to the emergence of new opposing alliances. The countries, attaching themselves to one or to the
other, find new interests that unite or separate them based on a pragmatic motivation instead
of the historical concerns. Hereby, the external field model enables the stabilization among the
countries while keeping the short range character of the interactions between them. This insight
will be investigated in a forthcoming paper.
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